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Digest: Richardson v. Superior Court
Holly Buchanan

Opinion by Moreno, J., with Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and
Corrigan, J. Dissenting Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J.
Issues
( 1) What is the correct standard of review for a ruling on a motion for
DNA testing under Penal Code section 1405?
(2) What must be established to satisfy the "materiality" and
"reasonable probability" requirements under Section 1405?
Facts
On September 12, 1989, petltwner Charles Keith Richardson was
charged with residential burglary, rape, sodomy, "lewd and lascivious acts
on a child under the age of 14," and the murder of eleven-year-old April
Holley.' Four pubic hair samples recovered from the crime scene were
admitted at trial. 2 The prosecution's hair analysis experts disputed whether
all four of the samples matched petitioner's DNA. 3 Petitioner's experts
disagreed with the conclusions of the prosecution's experts that any of the
hair samples were consistent with the petitioner's. 4 Petitioner was
convicted on all counts and sentenced to death. 5 Upon automatic appeal to
the Supreme Court of California, the Court affirmed the judgment. 6
On May 24, 2004, petitioner filed a motion under Section 1405
seeking DNA testing of the hair samples. 7 The trial court denied the
motion because petitioner failed to show that the evidence was material and
that there was a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more
favorable result. 8 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or
prohibition. 9 The Supreme Court of California denied the petition. 10
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Analysis
1. Relevant Subdivisions of Section 1405

Section 1405(a) provides that an inmate convicted of a felony may
make a written motion for DNA testing of evidence. 11 The trial court may
only grant the motion if eight conditions are metY Subdivision (f)( 4)
requires the moving party to make a prima facie showing that "the evidence
sought to be tested is material to the issue ofthe convicted person's identity
as the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, special circumstance, or
enhancement allegation that resulted in the conviction or sentence." 13
Subdivision (f)(5) requires the moving party to make a prima facie showing
that "[t]he requested DNA testing results would raise a reasonable
probability that the convicted person's verdict or sentence would have been
favorable if the results of DNA testing had been available at the time of
conviction." 14 Subdivision G) authorizes appellate review of the order
granting or denying the motion through a writ of mandate or prohibition. 15
2. Standard of Review
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the correct standard of
review for a Section 1405 motion is substantial evidence. 16 The Court said
that the correct standard is abuse of discretion, because a trial court must
weigh the evidence in determining whether the requirements of the statute
have been met. 17 The Court found this conclusion supported by comparing
the statute's purpose to Penal Code section 1181 (8), which authorizes a
trial court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 18 The
standard of review of a trial court's denial of a new trial under Section
1181 is abuse of discretion. 19
3. Meaning of "Materiality" and "Reasonable Probability"
The Court noted that Section 1405(f)(4) does not define "material."20
The Court found that the test for materiality differs in other contexts. 21 The
standard used in Pitchess v. Superior Court requires a showing that the
evidence be admissible. 22 The standard used in Brady v. Maryland, on the
other hand, requires a showing that there be a reasonable probability that
the result of the trial would have been more favorable. 23 The Court adopted
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the lower Pitchess threshold because that case, like Section 1405(£)(4),
concerned the discovery of evidence. 24 The Court found this conclusion to
be supported by the legislative history. 25
The Court noted that the term "reasonable probability" has been
interpreted by courts in other contexts to mean a reasonable probability that
the result would have been more favorable in the absence of the error. 26
The Court adopted this interpretation, concluding that Section 1405(f)(5)
requires the defendant to show that, "had the DNA testing been available,
in light of all the evidence, there is a reasonable probability-that is, a
reasonable chance and not merely an abstract possibility-that the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. " 27
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court concluded that
petitioner had established that the DNA test of the hair samples would have
been material to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator. 28 But the Court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's
motion because the court found that there was other substantial evidence
linking him to the crime. 29 Since the hair samples were not conclusive on
the issue of his guilt, the court found that he failed to satisfy the
"reasonable probability" requirement. 30
Holding
The Court held that the correct standard of review for a trial court's
denial of DNA testing of newly discovered evidence under Section 1405 is
abuse of discretionY The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying petitioner's Section 1405 motion because he failed
to establish that there was a "reasonable probability" of a more favorable
result. 32 The Court discharged the order to show cause and denied the
petition. 33
Dissent
Justice Chin decried the expense of the four years of litigation created
by the trial court's ruling. 34 He said that the majority interpreted
subdivision (f)(5) too literally and that this section does not require such
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extensive and thorough analysis of the evidence. 35 He said that "the
Legislature did not intend to make litigation over whether to conduct
testing more time-consuming and costly than the testing itself."36
Instead, Justice Chin explained, Section 1405 should be interpreted to
"require only a preliminary assessment of whether testing results would
raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome.'m He said that this
assessment should be based on the evidence and arguments set forth in the
motion for testing itself, not the entire trial court record. 38 This, he said,
would be consistent with legislative intent not to permit routine testing in
all cases and would be less time-consuming and expensive. 39
Justice Chin recommended that the legislature amend Section 1405 to
impose a lower threshold for DNA testing. 40 He also said that a
preliminary assessment of the evidence in this case would have satisfied the
requirements of Section 1405(f)(4) and (f)(5). 41
Legal Significance
This decision clarifies the standard of review for a ruling on a motion
for DNA testing and the "materiality" and "reasonable probability"
requirements under Section 1405. The relatively low thresholds of
materiality and reasonable probability will make it easier to prevail at the
trial court level on a Section 1405 motion. The high abuse of discretion
standard, however, will insulate the trial court's decision from review.
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